Chris Lawrence vs. Leigh Ann Lawrence Leigh Ann Lawrence ("Mother") secretly tape recorded her 2 1/2-year-old daughter's telephone conversation with the child's father, Chris Lawrence ("Father"), during the course of a divorce and custody dispute. After the divorce was concluded, Father filed a complaint against Mother seeking damages for, among other things, wiretapping in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _39-13-601 (2006). Father filed a motion for partial summary judgment which the trial court denied upon finding that "[n]o set of facts would create liability under _39-13-601 et seq. for [Mother's] interception of [Father's] communication with his daughter." The court then entered partial summary judgment in favor of Mother and certified the judgment as final. Father appeals. We affirm. | Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William Collier v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden The petitioner, William Collier, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus wherein he challenged his November 2008 convictions of possession of heroin with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief via a sentence illegality. Discerning no error, we affirm the habeas corpus court's summary dismissal of the petition. | Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Ayres Hewitt Appellant John Ayres Hewitt was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense and several other offenses stemming from a traffic stop and ensuing blood alcohol test. He was given an effective sentence of 11 months and 29 days, which was to be suspended after 150 days in custody. On appeal, Appellant contends that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Appellant cites the videotape from the officer's dashboard camera as evidence that he did not engage in any suspicious driving and as a basis for discrediting the officer's testimony. Based upon our review, we see no error in the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress. However, we have determined that there are errors in the sentences noted on the judgments in counts ten and eleven. We therefore must remand the case to the | Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Walter Grooms The defendant, James Walter Grooms, appeals his Hamblen County Criminal Court jury conviction of telephone harassment, a Class A misdemeanor, for which he received a sentence of 11 months and 29 days' incarceration suspended after the service of 10 days in jail. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emmett Lejuan Harvell and Bardell Nelson Joseph, A/K/A Shawn Anglin, A/K/A Billontae Smontez Adams The defendants, Emmett Lejuan Harvell and Bardell Nelson Joseph, were both convicted of the facilitation of tampering with evidence, a Class D felony, and simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, a Class E felony. In addition, Defendant Joseph was convicted of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. On appeal, both defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and Defendant Joseph argues that he was sentenced improperly. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. | Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry B. Johnson v. State of Tennessee The Petitioner, Terry B. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and resulting 15-year sentence. The Petitioner contends (1) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) he was denied a "full and fair hearing" on his petition due to the ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel; and (3) he was denied a "full and fair hearing" on his petition because the judge presiding over his post-conviction proceedings also presided over the original trial proceedings. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon D. Thomas | Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joann Davis v. Harwell Enterprises This appeal involves the application of the statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-203(g (2)(B) (2008) to a suit for workers' compensation benefits. An employee who sustained a compensable injury and who received authorized medical treatment filed a civil action in the Chancery Court for Giles County more than one year after the last payment of medical benefits. Her employer filed a "special motion to dismiss" on the ground that the suit was time-barred. The trial court, relying on the discovery rule, denied the motion on the ground that the limitations period did not begin to run until the employee's attorney received a letter from her treating physician stating [*2] that her injury was work-related. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the employer permission to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9 and referred the appeal to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51 for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We have determined that the statute of limitations bars the employee's complaint and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court. | Giles | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Fieldstone Farms Homeowners Association, et al. v. Cavender Enterprises, LLC The trial court found that a parcel designated as a recreational facility in a planned unit development was a "lot" under the terms of the governing declarations such that it could not be subdivided or subjected to a revised use. Under the original declaration, the recreational parcel was expressly excluded within the definition of lot but the later supplemented declaration omits the exclusion. Finding that according to its terms the Supplementary Declaration could not conflict with the original declaration, we find the parcel was not included within the definition of lot. Consequently, it is not subject to the restrictions placed on lots. As there is no prohibition to subdivision or conversion to residential use in the documents governing the parcel, then the parcel may be subdivided and converted to residential use. Accordingly, the trial court is reversed. | Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Monya Jill Rayanne Roberts vs. James Kevin Roberts On appeal, James Kevin Roberts ("Husband") challenges the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance to allow his fifth attorney time to prepare for trial, the trial court's refusal to exclude an expert witness called by Monya Jill Rayanne Roberts ("Wife"), the division of the marital estate, the amount of child support and the award of discretionary costs to Wife. Wife challenges the trial court's denial of her request for "supplemental" attorney's fees. We affirm. | Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
New South Federal Savings Bank vs. Brenda Pugh This is an appeal of two unlawful detainer actions consolidated below. New South Federal Savings Bank ("New South") filed separate detainer warrants against Brenda Pugh seeking possession of two non-adjacent properties conveyed to New South at a foreclosure sale instituted after Pugh defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust on the 1 properties. The general sessions court dismissed the actions. On appeal, the trial court rejected Pugh's challenge to the foreclosure. The court held in favor of New South and ordered that it be restored to possession of the properties. Pugh appeals. We affirm. | Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Agnew vs. Meritan, et al In this matter, the plaintiff appeals the decision of the Board of Review of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that he is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-7-301, as a result of his failure to establish that he had covered wages not provided by an unemployment workrelief program financed by a federal agency under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-7-207(c)(5)(G). The trial court upheld the decision of the Board of Review. We affirm. | Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Holllow, Trustee, et al vs. Michael L. Ingram, et al The parties, owners of a tract of land, ultimately agreed to the sale of the property by a Special Master appointed by the Court. The sale was held and the Master ultimately reported the purchase and asked that the sale be confirmed. Before the Court acted on the Master's Report, the plaintiff moved for a dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 41, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed the case. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court was required to act on the Master's Report before entertaining any motion to dismiss the case, and reinstate the action and remand for further proceedings. | Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Joe Walls This appeal arises out of a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Upon the death of the testator, Billy Joe Walls, wills executed by him were submitted for probate in different states. Patricia Pemberton was appointed personal representative under a 2009 will admitted to probate in the trial court. Barbara Brown is the appointed personal representative under a 2007 will admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama. Brown initiated these proceedings by filing a complaint in the trial court 1 to contest the will submitted by Pemberton. Subsequently, Brown sought summary judgment, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, Brown moved to transfer the case to Alabama under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court dismissed Pemberton's petition on both grounds. She appeals. We affirm. | Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Connell Norton A Franklin County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Connell Norton, for one count of possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence against him, which was seized during a search of his home following a warrantless entry. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The defendant pled guilty to possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver, but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search of his home was lawful. Because the trial court failed to state in the record the factual findings and conclusions of law supporting the denial of the motion to suppress, we are precluded from reviewing the issue before us. Therefore, we remand the case for the trial court to enter an order stating its factual findings and conclusions of law, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark A. Owens The defendant, Mark A. Owens, was convicted by a Lake County jury of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Donnell Pirtle The defendant, Terrence Donnell Pirtle, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver or sell, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective term of four years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress on the basis that the search warrant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between his alleged criminal activity and the residence where the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found. The State responds by arguing that the defendant has waived the issue by his failure to include it in his motion for new trial or to provide an adequate record for our review. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. | Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyrick Lalord Mcintosh A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Tyrick Lalord McIntosh, of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to six years at 30% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jane Doe and John Doe v. Walgreens Company, et al. This is an appeal from the grant of Appellees/Defendants' Tenn. R Civ. P 12.02 motion to dismiss. Appellant Jane Doe, who is HIV positive, was employed by Appellee Walgreens. In an effort to keep her medical condition private, Ms. Doe had her prescriptions filled at a Walgreens location other than the one at which she worked; therefore, Ms. Doe was also a customer of Walgreens. A co-worker of Ms. Doe's accessed Ms. Doe's prescription history in the Walgreens' database, and then disseminated her medical information to other coworkers and to Ms. Doe's fianc_. Ms. Doe and her fianc_ filed suit. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the Does' exclusive remedy was under the workers' compensation act. Finding that the injuries sustained by Ms. Doe do not arise out of her employment with Walgreens, and that she has sufficiently pled causes of action outside workers' compensation law, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand. | Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James L. Johnson v. Howard Carlton, Warden Petitioner, James Lee Johnson, appeals from the dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he argued that the trial court erred by failing to merge his three convictions and that the sole remaining conviction had expired. After a review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus because Petitioner has failed to establish that his judgments were void or that his sentences have expired. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. | Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas David Johnson A Marion County jury convicted the Defendant, Thomas David Johnson, of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to three years, to be suspended after the service of sixty days in jail. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) that the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion; and (3) that the trial court erred when it denied him full probation. After a thorough review of the law and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Alexander Beasley, IV The Defendant, William Alexander Beasley, IV, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court: (1) erred when it denied his request for an alternative sentence; and (2) failed to properly apply pre-trial jail credit to his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the sentence of incarceration, but we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment that includes jail credits of 205 days. | Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas M. Goss v. State of Tennessee A Moore County jury convicted the Petitioner, Thomas M. Goss, of one count of rape and one count of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. | Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ray Bell Construction Co. vs. State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation - Dissenting I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission. I believe the Claims Commission erred in finding a latent ambiguity in the contract, and as this was the purported basis for the Claims Commission’s decision, I would reverse the decision of the Claims Commission and grant judgment to the Tennessee Department of Transportation. | Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ray Bell Construction Co. vs. State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation Tennessee Claims Commission - This case concerns an alleged breach of contract involving the incentive clause of a Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT") road construction contract. Before the Claims Commission, TDOT argued that the contract language was clear in prohibiting an extension, alteration, or amendment of the incentive clause. The Claims Commission agreed with the position of Ray Bell Construction Company ("RBCC") that it was entitled to a modification of the incentive provision. To so find, the Commission held that "a definite latent ambiguity exists for which parol evidence not only is admissible, but frankly, absolutely necessary in both understanding and deciding the issues in this case." TDOT has appealed. We affirm the decision of the Claims Commission. | Shelby | Court of Appeals |
